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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal lies with the Utah Supreme Court 
which pursuant to order transferred this matter to the Utah Court 
of Appeals on or about August 16, 1994. Jurisdiction in the Utah 
Court of Appeals is vested pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j). 
ISSUES RAISED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did appellant produce sufficient evidence at trial to 
establish a prima facie case that a dangerous condition existed 
in the elevators of which appellees had or should have had 
knowledge in time to repair or replace? 
Standard of Review: 
In reviewing the granting of a motion for directed verdict 
by the trial court, the appellate court examines the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-prevailing party to determine 
if the evidence would support a judgment. 
2. Was the trial court precluded by this Court's prior 
opinion in Kleinert v. Kimball, 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 1993), 
from determining whether plaintiff presented a prima facie case 
sufficient to reach the jury? 
Standard of Review; 
Appellate Court review of a trial court determination of an 
issue of law is based on the standard of whether the trial court 
correctly applied controlling law to the issue, the so-called 
"correctness" standard. 
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3. Did the trial court err in not submitting the case to 
the jury on a common carrier liability theory? 
Standard of Review: 
Same as 2, above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 3 0(a). 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court 
may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise 
dispose of any order or judgment appealed 
from. If the findings of fact in a case are 
incomplete, the court may order the trial 
court or agency to supplement, modify, or 
complete the findings to make them conform 
to the issues presented and the facts as 
found from the evidence and may direct the 
trial court or agency to enter judgment in 
accordance with the findings as revised. 
The court may also order a new trial or 
further proceedings to be conducted. If a 
new trial is granted, the court may pass 
upon and determine all questions of law 
involved in the case presented upon the 
appeal and necessary to the final 
determination of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action for personal injuries. Plaintiff below 
and appellant herein claims to have been involved in an elevator 
accident on April 16, 1984. The alleged accident took place at 
a building located at and known as 185 South State. Defendants/ 
appellees (hereinafter "defendants" or "Boyer Company") were the 
owners and managers of the building and its elevators. An 
elevator service contract had been purchased by defendants from 
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the manufacturer and installer of the elevators, Kimball Elevator 
Company, previously a party to this action. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff's alleged accident occurred April 16, 1984. Her 
action for personal injuries was commenced in the Third Judicial 
District Court on or about March 17, 1988, approximately one 
month before the expiration of the four-year statute of limita-
tions. 
Defendants originally were the manufacturer and installer of 
the elevator system, Kimball Elevator Company (hereinafter 
"Kimball"), and the owners and managers of the building in 
question, Boyer Company, et al. The case proceeded forward at 
the trial court until motions for summary judgment were filed by 
both Kimball and Boyer Company. The motions of both defendants 
were granted and plaintiff appealed. That previous appeal, 
hereinafter referred to as Kleinert I was decided by the Utah 
Court of Appeals on or about June 4, 1993. See Kleinert v. 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 1993). This Court 
upheld Kimball's motion for summary judgment for lack of evidence 
of a defect in the elevators. Boyer's summary judgment was 
reversed. This Court remanded for further proceedings. 
Upon remand the case proceeded to a jury trial on March 22, 
1994. At the close of plaintiff's case on March 24, 1994, the 
trial court granted defendants' motion for directed verdict 
finding the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of a 
3 
dangerous condition in the elevators of which defendants had or 
should have had knowledge. (Finding of Fact, Record pp. 1064-
1068). 
Plaintiff then brought this appeal (Kleinert II) . 
Defendants have previously filed a motion for summary disposition 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10. The Utah Supreme Court reserved 
ruling on said motion pursuant to Rule 10(f) in its order of July 
8, 1994. 
This appeal was poured-over to the Court of Appeals from the 
Utah Supreme Court on or about August 16, 1994. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Background, 
Because this is an appeal from the granting of a motion for 
a directed verdict, this brief will focus on the evidence 
produced at trial during plaintiffs case relative to the two 
claims of error raised in this appeal. Those are: (1) was there 
evidence of a dangerous condition in the elevators of which Boyer 
Company knew or should have known prior to plaintiff's alleged 
accident of April 16, 1984, and (2) was evidence produced by 
plaintiff to establish liability under the common carrier 
standard of care? 
The purpose of this factual review is also to demonstrate 
the difference between "malfunctions", of which there was 
evidence at trial, and "dangerous conditions" creating a duty by 
Boyer Company to repair or replace. 
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2. Review of Trial Evidence, 
(a) Generally. 
Before resting her case (Record pp. 1675, 1676 and 1041), 
plaintiff called 16 witnesses including herself over the course 
of three days. Of plaintiff's witnesses six were health care 
providers and one was a records custodian who offered no evidence 
regarding liability. The testimony of the remaining nine 
witnesses will be reviewed seriatim. 
The only other evidence produced by plaintiff relevant to 
liability consisted of the service and material receipts (Exhibit 
8-P, Record p. 1276), plaintiff's summary of the service and 
material receipts (Exhibit 2-P, Record p. 1234), the elevator 
service agreement between Boyer Company and Kimball Elevator 
Company (Exhibit 6-P, Record p. 1266) and correspondence 
concerning and copies of elevator service agreements between 
Boyer Company and Kimball Elevator (Exhibits P3 through P7, 
Record pp. 1307, 1308). 
(b) Review of Trial Evidence, 
1. Plaintiff's first witness was her husband, Karl 
Kleinert. Mr. Kleinert offered no testimony regarding any 
alleged prior problems with the elevators in defendants' 
building. Likewise, no testimony was given by Mr. Kleinert as to 
the standard of care of building owners or managers or whether 
other safety measures could have been taken. Mr. Kleinert 
offered no evidence that there were any problems or conditions 
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with the elevators of which defendants knew or should have had 
knowledge. (Testimony of Karl Kleinert, Record pp. 1180-1203). 
2. Plaintiff's second witness was one of the two attorneys 
for whom she worked at Parsons, Behle & Latimer at the time of 
her alleged accident. That witness, Mr. David Hirschi, offered 
no evidence regarding a dangerous condition in the elevator or 
knowledge thereof on the part of the building owner or manager 
prior to April 16, 1984. Likewise, Mr. Hirschi offered no 
evidence regarding the standard of care of owners or managers of 
buildings or whether any such standard was breached by defendants 
in this case. (Record pp. 1205-1220). 
3. The next witness was a co-worker, Merleen Pearce. No 
evidence was offered through Ms. Pearce regarding the standard of 
care of building owners or managers or any claimed breach of such 
a standard of care. No evidence was offered that other safety 
measures could have been adopted. (Record pp. 1221-1228). 
Ms. Pearce testified knowing of two occasions when she was 
"stuck" in the elevators. (Record p. 1223) . However, she also 
testified that neither she nor anyone else was injured in any 
way. (Record p. 1225) . In particular, no one was "bounced 
around" or "knocked to the floor" as claimed by plaintiff. 
(Record p. 1226). Also, Ms. Pearce could not recall whether 
either incident was before plaintiff's alleged accident. She 
testified that it was just as likely that it was after as before. 
(Record p. 1227) . 
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Also, there was no evidence offered through Ms. Pearce that 
any such incidents, even if they occurred before plaintiff's 
incident, were ever reported to or made known to defendants, 
(Record pp. 1220-1228). 
4. Plaintiff's next witness was Mr. Brent Russon, the 
local manager of Kimball Elevator Company. Mr. Russon's testi-
mony not only failed to establish any evidence of dangerous 
condition in the elevators at or prior to plaintiff's alleged 
accident (Record pp. 1230-1275), but affirmatively established 
the following: 
(a) The service and material receipts were records of 
all service calls made by Kimball and used for billing Boyer 
Company. (Record p. 1238) . 
(b) Under the elevator service agreement purchased from 
Kimball by the Boyer Company, there was no period of time that 
the elevators were not covered under a service agreement or 
warranty. (Record pp. 1278-1280). 
(c) In the contract accepted by Boyer Company there was 
no compromise of elevator safety. (Record p. 1280) . 
(d) Boyer Company had procedures in place to report to 
Kimball all service needs for the elevators. (Record p. 1283). 
(e) The fact that there is a service call does not mean 
that there is a safety problem. (Record pp. 1282-1283). 
(f) He never received calls or reports from any source 
of injuries or safety hazards regarding the elevators in question 
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at or before the time of plaintiff's alleged accident. In this 
regard, Mr. Russon's testimony was as follows: 
Q. Well, let me ask you this. Without 
taking the time now to review all those, 
based on your personal recollection, Mr. 
Russon, and your dealings with both the 
Boyer Company and your involvement with 
the elevator service at the building at 
185 South State, do you have any 
recollection of reports coming in during 
this 1983 and early 1984 time frame of 
the elevators either injuring or harming 
any of the occupants or those types of 
safety issues coming in from any of the 
service calls that you receive? 
A. No. 
Q. Would it be fair then to say that so far 
as you were concerned those elevators, at 
least through April of 1984, were free of 
complaints that they were injuring or 
harming any people? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, you've never received up to that 
time you've never received any report, 
had you, of elevators dropping and rising 
several floors at a time, throwing the 
people around inside them had you? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you ever received any such report 
other than the plaintiff's allegations in 
this case with regard to the Kimball 1210 
elevators in that building at 185 South 
State? 
A. No. 
(Record pp. 1289-1290). 
(g) Mr. Russon explained that many of the service calls 
were the result of a governor switch or other regulator switch 
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being tripped by power fluctuations or other causes that did not 
constitute a safety hazard, (Record pp. 1282, 1283, 1291). 
(h) When a switch would be "tripped" the elevator would 
stop not in an abrupt manner, but would stop until the switch was 
reset by a technician. (Record p. 1285). 
(i) Kimball conducted regular service inspections of 
the elevator as a routine precaution. (Record p. 1287). 
(j) Some of the service calls were in response to the 
elevator key switches being turned to independent operations so 
that they would not respond to calls. This was not a safety 
hazard. (Record p. 1291). 
(k) The operation of the circuit switches which shut 
down the elevator in an event of power fluctuations constituted 
a safety precaution in the elevator system and was, in fact, 
desirable. (Record p. 1292). 
(1) There is no difference in the guaranteeing the 
safety of the elevators between the contracts proposed by Kimball 
and the contracts signed by Boyer. (Record p. 1293) . 
5. Plaintiff's fifth witness was the representative of 
defendant Boyer Company, Mr. Dean Peterson. Mr. Peterson testi-
fied that he acted as the property manager for the building in 
question at and before the time of the plaintiff's alleged 
accident. (Record pp. 1299, 1300). During this time he had no 
recollection of elevator accidents having been reported. (Record 
p. 1323). 
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Also, although an experienced and qualified property 
manager, no evidence was produced regarding the standard of care 
of building owners and managers or that there was a breach or a 
violation of such standard in this case. No evidence was 
produced to establish what additional safety measures Boyer could 
have taken, (Record pp. 1299-1348). 
Mr. Peterson was questioned regarding two alleged elevator 
accidents. However, neither alleged "accident" was admitted for 
the purpose of the truthfulness of whether the accident occurred 
and both were subsequent to plaintiff's alleged accident. 
(Record pp. 1325, 1341-1343). 
6. Plaintiff's next witness was Mr. Ed Williams, a 
technician for Kimball Elevator Company. Again, no evidence was 
offered through Mr. Williams of any accidents, injuries or 
dangerous conditions in the elevators at 185 South State prior to 
plaintiff's alleged accident. (Record pp. 1349-1376). Contrary 
to plaintiff's brief, there was no testimony from Mr. Williams 
that any of the service calls were for conditions that consti-
tuted a hazard to elevators users. This included the so-called 
"yo-yoing" incident which in reality was a gradual leveling off 
of the elevator across a maximum distance of eight inches. As 
stated by Mr. Williams: 
Q. Now then, what is it that you are 
describing here with the phrase 
"yo-yoing". 
A. When the elevator comes into the floor it 
will sometimes overshoot a little bit and 
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level back up. You have an eight inch 
range so you can be four inches above or 
four inches below the floor. 
Q. Okay. So then if I understand, when you 
say "yo-yoing," does that eight inch 
range then set a limit in terms of the 
fluctuation as the elevator is trying to 
level off? 
* * * 
Q. Have you ever heard of anybody in the 
process of the yo-yoing, the trying to 
seek that level position in the elevator 
of that process in and of itself, 
injuring anybody? 
A. No, I haven't. 
(Record pp. 1372-1374). 
Mr. Williams testified that the rising and falling by the 
elevators at 185 South State, as claimed by plaintiff, was 
"impossible". (Record p. 1373). 
No testimony was given by Mr. Williams as to the 
availability of additional safety features that were not employed 
by Boyer or Kimball. (Testimony of Ed Williams, Record pp. 1349-
1376). 
Despite testimony that elevators could stop "pretty 
suddenly" if a circuit was flipped (Record pp. 1361-1362) , no 
testimony was given by Mr. Williams as to any such incidents 
actually occurring causing any injury or danger to elevator users 
at a time prior to plaintiff's alleged accident. (Record pp. 
1375-1376). 
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7. Plaintiff next called Renee Esson, another co-worker at 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer. Ms. Esson described "problems" with 
the elevators which were the elevator "getting stuck" or the 
"lights would be off" or the elevators otherwise not working 
properly. (Record p. 1381). Ms. Esson also testified as to 
personally being stuck in the elevators on one occasion. (Record 
p. 1382) . However, her incident was not reported that she knows 
of. (Record p. 1383) . Ms. Esson admitted that no one was 
injured in any of the incidents she was aware of. (Record pp. 
1386, 1387). 
There was nothing from Ms. Esson's testimony with regard to 
a violation of the common carrier standard as urged by plaintiff. 
(Record pp. 1377-1388). 
8. Next was the other attorney for whom plaintiff worked 
at Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Mr. Robert Hyde. Mr. Hyde testified 
as to what was reported to him by plaintiff regarding her alleged 
incident. (Record pp. 1391-1393). He did not offer testimony or 
evidence regarding hazardous or dangerous conditions in the 
elevators at any time prior to plaintiff's alleged incident. 
Likewise, Mr. Hyde offered no evidence to support a finding that 
Boyer breached a common carrier duty of care. (Testimony of 
Robert Hyde (Record pp. 1390-1399)). 
9. The only other witness regarding the liability issues 
in the case was plaintiff herself, Deanna Kleinert. Plaintiff's 
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testimony constitutes pages 1617 through 1675 of the record in 
this case. 
Her only testimony regarding "problems" with the elevators 
before her alleged incident is found at pages 1627 through 1630 
of the record. Regarding that incident (elevators not working) 
there was no evidence that it created a danger. Rather, she and 
another merely had to take the stairs instead. Also, she could 
not recall if it was ever reported. (See Record pp. 1327-1330) . 
Following her testimony about this single incident, 
plaintiff proceeded to describe the alleged accident of April 16, 
1984. (Record pp. 1640-1647). She then described her alleged 
injuries and course of treatment thereafter. (Record pp. 1649-
1675). Plaintiff rested her case at page 1676. No evidence was 
offered through plaintiff of any other incidents prior to her 
own, as to the standard of care of building owners or managers or 
safety precautions that might have been taken. (See testimony of 
plaintiff, Deanna Kleinert, pp. 1617-1676). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I, 
The record in this case is void of evidence which plaintiff 
was required to produce in order to establish a prima facie case 
against Boyer Company. More particularly, plaintiff failed to 
produce evidence of (a) the existence of a dangerous condition in 
the elevators; (b) that Boyer Company knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have known of the dangerous condition; or 
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(c) that Boyer Company was on notice of the dangerous condition 
in time to take corrective action. 
Plaintiff continues to mistakenly refer to evidence of 
operational interruptions with the elevators as constituting a 
"dangerous condition". The evidence at trial clearly showed that 
these "malfunctions" did not constitute evidence of a dangerous 
condition and that most were annoyances. Because of the lack of 
evidence of a dangerous condition, plaintiff failed to establish 
a prima facie case as set forth by decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals including its decision in the prior appeal of this case. 
POINT II, 
Contrary to plaintiff's claim of error by the trial court, 
this court's ruling on the summary judgment issue in the prior 
appeal did not mandate that plaintiff's case be submitted to the 
jury regardless of what evidence was presented. 
The law of the case doctrine applies to rulings by superior 
or co-equal courts in the same case on issues of law. This 
Court's determination in the prior appeal that "sufficient 
evidence" existed to preclude summary judgment was a factual 
determination which did not by itself preclude a directed 
verdict. On remand from the first appeal, plaintiff maintained 
her burden of proving a prima facie case which she failed to do. 
The trial court was therefore not barred by reason of the prior 
appeal from considering a directed verdict. 
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POINT III, 
Plaintiff's claim that the trial court committed error in 
failing to submit the case to a jury on a common carrier 
liability theory against Boyer Company fails both as a matter of 
law and for lack of any evidence at trial tending to establish a 
breach of such a standard of care. 
Utah law has not recognized application of a common carrier 
standard of care in the landlord-tenant relationship. To the 
contrary, this court has continued to apply a "reasonable care" 
standard in such actions as recently as 1994. These decisions 
are subsequent to the case authority relied on by plaintiff. 
Moreover, plaintiff's authority does not adopt common carrier 
liability in the landlord-tenant context but is mere dicta and is 
not controlling in the present case. 
This court has already determined in the prior appeal that 
the proper standard of care to be applied by the trial court was 
one of "reasonable care". That ruling on an issue of law by the 
Court of Appeals constituted law of the case in this matter. 
Finally, even if this court were to apply a common carrier 
standard of care as the requisite duty of landlords vis-a-vis 
their tenants, plaintiff failed at trial to produce evidence of 
a violation of such a standard by the Boyer Company. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE AND A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PROPER. 
As in any appeal from the granting of a motion for directed 
verdict, the inquiry is whether evidence was presented at trial 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Plaintiff's case, 
even considered in a light most favorable to her, fell far short 
of establishing the legal requisites of her claims against 
defendants. 
A. No Evidence was Offered that Established the Existence of a 
Dangerous Condition of Which Defendants Had or Should Have 
Had Knowledge, 
It is important to note that confusion has existed in this 
case, and continues to exist in the mind of plaintiff, as to what 
constitutes a dangerous condition necessitating either repair or 
replacement of the elevators in question by defendants. Indeed, 
this Court in Kleinert I specified that it was the existence of 
a "dangerous condition" known to these defendants or of which 
they should have had knowledge that gives rise to the duty to 
repair or replace. See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co. , 854 
P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993). 
Plaintiff still fails to distinguish between a dangerous 
condition in the elevators and "problems" or "malfunctions". 
Indeed, plaintiff relies on the mere fact that there were 
"service calls" on the elevators in question to support a 
conclusion that the elevators were "dangerous". 
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This Court should not be drawn into the same mistake of 
equating malfunctions with a dangerous condition. 
As stated by this Court in Kleinert I: 
When a plaintiff's claim is based on the 
owner's failure to repair rather than on 
affirmative negligence, the plaintiff has 
the burden of showing the owner knew, or in 
the exercise of ordinary care should have 
known, a dangerous condition existed and the 
owner had sufficient time to take corrective 
action. 
Id. at 1028 (emphasis added). 
As recently as 1994, this Court has applied the same test. 
In Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P. 2d 570 (Utah App. 
1994) , this Court cited with approval the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 288 C (1965): 
Rather, the focus is whether "a reasonably 
prudent person should have known, or could 
have learned by the exercise of reasonable 
care," that a dangerous condition existed. 
Schreiter, 871 P.2d at 575 (emphasis added). 
In the present case plaintiff succeeded in producing 
evidence that the elevators were not free from operational 
interruptions.1 However, no evidence was produced of a dangerous 
condition. 
There was also limited evidence of alleged "accidents" in 
the elevators which occurred in 1986 and 1988, long after 
1
 Examples of this evidence includes plaintiff's testimony that 
she experienced one incident where the elevator would not respond 
to the call button and she was forced to take the stairs. (Record 
pp. 1628-1629); Renee Esson's testimony that "occasionally an 
elevator would get stuck or it wouldn't open properly or the lights 
would be off". (Record p. 1381). 
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plaintiff's alleged incident in 1984.2 However, there was no 
evidence of any such incidents before plaintiff's accident so 
that Boyer Company "had sufficient time to take corrective 
action." Kleinert, 854 P.2d at 1028. 
The present action is indistinguishable from the case before 
this Court in Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs. , Ltd. , 754 P. 2d 89 
(Utah App. 1988), which was cited by this Court in Kleinert I. 
Like the present case the claim in Gregory was an action for 
personal injuries against a landlord. Also, as in the present 
case, the trial court granted the landlord's motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case at trial. On 
appeal of the directed verdict the Utah Court of Appeals 
announced the standard of the landlord's duty of care to be as 
follows: 
The plaintiff must demonstrate that 
defendant knew, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should have known, that a 
dangerous condition existed and that 
sufficient time had elapsed to take 
corrective action. 
Id. at 91. 
Applying this standard the Court of Appeals reviewed the 
evidence and found that there was no evidence offered by 
plaintiff that defendant had notice "of any defects or poten-
tially hazardous conditions". Id. In concluding that the 
2
 Over objections as to relevancy and the hearsay nature of 
these alleged incidents, the trial court permitted plaintiff's 
counsel to question witnesses about these incidents but only for 
the purpose of showing the reporting process to Boyer Company. 
(See Record pp. 1325-1326 and pp. 1341-1342). 
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directed verdict was proper, this Court announced the principle 
that: 
The mere fact that the building collapsed 
with the snow accumulation weighing approxi-
mately 10-13 pounds per square foot is not 
sufficient evidence to establish that 
defendant breached its duty of reasonable 
care toward plaintiff. 
* * * 
We concluded the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to persuade a reason-
able person that defendant violated any duty 
owed plaintiff or that the collapse of the 
building was due to defendant's negligence. 
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's 
directed verdict. 
Id. at 92 (emphasis added). 
In Gregory, the plaintiff was aware of the accumulation of 
snow (a problem) and was aware of creaking noises coming from the 
roof (another problem). However, as this Court found, there was 
no evidence that such "problems" constituted a safety hazard or 
that they were communicated to the defendant in time to determine 
if there was a dangerous condition and to take corrective action. 
In the present case there was evidence offered at trial of 
routine operational interruptions with the elevators, but no 
evidence to establish a dangerous condition that was in turn 
communicated to the Boyer Company. The lack of such evidence 
defeats a prima facie element of plaintiff's case, see Williams 
v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985), and a directed verdict 
is proper. See also, Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.f 565 P.2d 
1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977). 
B. The Documentary Evidence of Service Calls and the Elevator 
Service Contracts Did Not Establish Evidence of a Dangerous 
Condition, 
As in the prior appeal, plaintiff at trial relied upon 
receipts showing service calls by Kimball Elevator Company to the 
elevators at 185 South State to establish a prima facie case of 
a dangerous condition and a knowledge thereof by Boyer Company.3 
While it is true that the service receipts were known to the 
Boyer Company, the evidence at trial clarified the receipts and 
showed them in their true light. That is, evidence of service 
calls on routine, non-hazardous matters. These receipts did not 
put Boyer Company on notice of a "dangerous condition". At trial 
plaintiffs counsel questioned two witnesses regarding these 
service receipts. Both testified that the receipts did not 
evidence a safety hazard in the elevators. See testimony of 
Brent Russon, pp. 1283, 1289 and testimony of Ed Williams, Record 
pp. 1373-1376. 
Finally, plaintiff attempted to establish a violation of the 
"reasonable care" standard by showing that the Boyer Company 
declined Kimball's initial proposal for an elevator service 
contract.4 The hoped-for implication was that Boyer Company 
3
 These receipts constituted Trial Exhibit P8. 
4
 This evidence consisted of Kimball's initial service 
contract proposal in July 1983, exhibit 3-P; a subsequent Kimball 
proposed exhibit 4-P; and the signed contract between Kimball and 
Boyer, exhibit 5-P. Mr. Russon, Kimball's manager, testified that 
the differences in the contract proposals did not affect the kind 
of service the elevators received, only how service was paid for. 
(See Record pp. 1260-1261, 1287-1288). 
20 
opted for a contract that was inadequate to assure the safety of 
the elevators. Again, plaintiff failed in this regard, Mr. 
Brent Russon, the manager for Kimball Elevator with whom Boyer 
dealt on the elevator service contracts, testified: 
Q. Do you feel by not accepting your initial 
bid or proposal that they [Boyer Company] 
were short-changing or neglecting in any 
way the safety or the effective operation 
of the elevators? 
A. There's two questions there. One is 
safety, one is the operation. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I feel that they were not compromising 
the safety. I do believe that 
maintenance is required on elevators and 
that's why a proposed maintenance. And 
if I didn't, if I felt that it was not 
necessary I wouldn't propose it. So 
maintenance is necessary but I don't feel 
they compromised the safety. 
(Record p. 1280). 
Again, Mr. Russon testified: 
Q. The same features, so far as frequency of 
visit and the service that you provided 
in guaranteeing the safety of those 
elevators, existed regardless of which 
contract it was? 
A. Yes. 
(Record p. 1293). 
In short, neither the service receipts nor the negotiated 
service contract between Boyer and Kimball evidenced a dangerous 
condition that defendants either knew of or should have known of 
before plaintiff's accident. Likewise, these exhibits did not 
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evidence that Boyer in any way compromised the safety of the 
elevators or breached the "reasonable care" standard.5 
POINT II. 
THE PRIOR APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE THE TRIAL 
COURT FROM GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
A. This Courts Order on Remand From the Prior Appeal Did Not 
Require Submission to the Jury* 
Plaintiff's argument misconstrues this Court's order in 
Kleinert I and reads into the Court's order more than exists. 
After considering the issue of summary judgment in favor of Boyer 
Company and reversing the trial court's ruling, this Court 
ordered: "Accordingly, we will reverse and remand this issue to 
the trial court for further proceedings." Kleinert, 854 P.2d at 
1028. 
The order of remand for "further proceedings" was the sum 
and substance of the Court's order. There can be no doubt that 
this Court could have entered an order of the type plaintiff 
suggests. See Utah R. App. P. 3 0(a). However, this Court 
properly remanded only for "further proceedings". Plaintiff 
confuses the language of the opinion with the terms of this 
Court's order. As recognized by this Court in Amax Magnesium v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 848 P.2d 715 (Utah App. 1993): 
5
 Plaintiff did not produce evidence, in the form of expert 
opinion testimony, as to the standard of care among owners or 
managers of commercial property in the community. The only witness 
with such knowledge was Boyer's representative, Mr. Dean Peterson. 
Mr. Peterson was not questioned about either a "reasonableness" 
standard of care or a common carrier standard. (Record pp. 1299-
1348) . 
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Where the language used in the body of an 
appellate opinion conflicts with directions 
on remand, the latter controls. 
Id. at 718, cited with approval in In Re Estate of Painter v. 
Colorado, 671 P.2d 1332 (Colo. App. 1983). 
The trial court therefore did not violate this Courts order 
from Kleinert I and was not obligated to submit the case to the 
jury, regardless of whether plaintiff established her prima facie 
case. 
Plaintiff's argument that a directed verdict was precluded 
merely by the prior appeal must also be rejected for reasons of 
common sense and policy considerations. The denial of a summary 
judgment does not relieve the prevailing party of his or her 
burden to establish the prima facie elements of a case. 
Plaintiff's argument, extended to its logical conclusion, would 
permit her to reach a jury on the issue of liability without 
presenting any evidence but merely because a prior appellate 
ruling had denied summary judgment. 
Plaintiff's argument not only misconstrues this Court's 
order for "further proceedings" but would absolve herself of any 
requirement to produce evidence at trial or establish the prima 
facie elements of her case. 
B. The Law of the Case Did Not Preclude a Directed Verdict, 
As noted above, this Court's order in Kleinert I was for 
"further proceedings". Accordingly, there is nothing inconsis-
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tent with this order and the granting of a directed verdict at 
the close of plaintiff's case. 
The law of the case doctrine, as argued by plaintiff in her 
brief, is inapplicable because said doctrine has been held to 
apply only to a conclusive resolution of issues of law as opposed 
to factual determinations. Governor's Ranch v. Mercy of 
Colorado. 793 P.2d 648 (Colo. App. 1990); Zavarelli v. Might, 779 
P.2d 489 (Mont. 1989). As such, the law of the case doctrine has 
no application to the trial court's determination of the 
sufficiency of evidence on a motion for directed verdict. 
Indeed, the general rule is that the law of the case applies 
only to issues of law and does not bind the trial court as to 
fact issues: 
The general principle seems to be that the 
doctrine of the law of the case applies only 
to determinations of questions of law and 
not to questions of fact. It has been said 
that the doctrine of the law of the case 
applies to all questions of law identical to 
those on the former appeal, and on the same 
facts and to the same questions only, that 
the doctrine is rarely, and in a very 
limited classification, applied to matters 
of evidence as distinguished from rulings of 
law, and that a decision on appeal on a 
question of fact does not generally become 
the law of the case, nor estop the parties 
on a second trial from showing the true 
state of facts. 
5 Am.Jur.2d 198, Appeal and Error § 755 (1962) (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Montana in Zavarelli v. Might, supra, 
held that the trial court is not precluded by the appellate 
court's order on a prior appeal from examining the evidence and 
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reaching a new result as a part of remand for "further 
proceedings": 
When this Court reversed the first 
judgment of the District Court as to a 
prescriptive easement, and remanded the 
cause to the District Court for further 
proceedings, the cause was then before the 
District Court in the posture of not having 
a final judgment. In that situation, when 
there is nothing in the terms of the mandate 
to prevent itf the trial court has the 
power, on reconsideration, to find the same 
facts and change its holding, or to find 
different facts consistent with its original 
holding* 
Id* at 493 (emphasis added). See also. Imperial Chemical Indus., 
Ltd. v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp. , 354 F.2d 459 (2nd 
Cir. 1965). 
Moreover, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable here 
because, as admitted by plaintiff in her brief, the evidence 
considered by this court in Kleinert I was "in cursory form". 
(See Appellant's Brief, p. 7). Whereas at trial the same 
evidence was "fully explored". (Id. p. 7). In other words, the 
so-called "malfunctions" that were before this Court on the prior 
appeal were brought out, explained and shown by the trial 
witnesses to relate only to operational interruptions of the 
elevators and were not evidence of a dangerous condition. (See 
discussion under Point I, supra.) 
Courts from this and other jurisdictions have recognized 
that a common exception to the law of the case doctrine is 
created by the introduction of new evidence to the court. See 
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Richardson v. Grand Central Corp,P 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977) 
("Court may reconsider an issue already decided if presented 
again in a different light"); Moore v. 1600 Downing Street, Ltd,, 
668 P.2d 16 (Colo. App. 1983) (Issues previously decided may be 
reconsidered when new evidence is before the court). 
In the present case the "new evidence" was the explanation 
by plaintiff's own witnesses that the "malfunctions" did not 
create a dangerous condition but in fact were safety responses by 
the circuits and other mechanisms of the elevator system. 
The effect of the jury trial held in this case was to 
eliminate the inferences and presumptions in favor of plaintiff 
accorded by this court in consideration of the summary judgment 
issue. At trial the evidence was seen in the full light of 
examination and explanation. As a result, the new evidence 
consisted of seeing the so-called "malfunctions" for what they 
actually were and not as evidence of the dangerous condition. 
In Osdol v. Knappton Corp., 755 P.2d 744 (Or. App. 1988), 
the Oregon Court of Appeals dealt with similar issues. Plaintiff 
sued for personal injuries as a result of an automobile accident. 
Defendants were the other driver and his employer who was sued on 
the theory of respondeat superior. The employer was granted 
summary judgment on the issue of respondeat superior. Plaintiff 
appealed and the Oregon Appellate Court found an issue of fact 
precluding summary judgment and remanded to the trial court. 
Following remand, and at the close of the jury trial, plaintiff 
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moved for a directed verdict on the respondeat superior issue. 
The trial court denied a directed verdict on the grounds that the 
prior appellate ruling constituted law of the case to the effect 
that a fact issue existed thereby precluding a directed verdict. 
In discussing the trial court's erroneous assumption on the 
effect of its prior ruling and application of the law of the case 
doctrine, the Oregon Court framed the issues as follows: 
The threshold question is whether the trial 
court was correct in determining whether the 
law of the case prevented it from directing 
a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The law of 
the case principle precludes relitigation or 
reconsideration of a point of law decided on 
appeal at an earlier stage of this same 
case. 
* * * 
The question is whether that language 
[prior appellate ruling] required submitting 
the issue of respondeat superior to the jury 
or determined only that Knappton [employer] 
was not entitled to summary judgment. 
Id. at 746 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
The Oregon Appellate Court found that the trial court 
committed error in applying the law of the case doctrine to 
preclude the directed verdict. In explaining the effect of its 
prior appellate ruling, the Court stated: 
Our holding did not prevent plaintiff from 
raising the issue at trial by a motion for 
directed verdict. 
Id. at 746. 
As in Osdol, where the trial court was not precluded by the 
law of the case doctrine from granting a directed verdict, so in 
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the present case it did not preclude the trial judge from 
granting directed verdict which was otherwise appropriate for 
lack of evidence of a dangerous condition or notice thereof to 
Boyer Company. 
POINT III, 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DIRECTED 
VERDICT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF COMMON 
CARRIER LIABILITY. 
A. Utah Law Does Not Recognize Common Carrier Liability in the 
Present Case. 
Plaintiff relies upon Lamb v. B & B Amusement Corp., 869 
P.2d 926 (Utah 1993), to argue that Boyer Company was subject to 
a common carrier standard of care. However, the Utah Supreme 
Court decision in that case does not stand for the proposition 
urged by plaintiff. That case was an action for injuries from 
riding a roller coaster. On appeal from the granting of a motion 
of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, plaintiff 
argued that a common carrier standard of care should have been 
applied by the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this 
argument and refused to adopt the common carrier standard, 
holding: 
Consistent with the majority of courts that 
have ruled on this issue, we hold that the 
care required of amusement ride operators is 
the care that reasonably prudent persons 
would exercise under the circumstances. 
Id. at 931 (emphasis added). 
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The language of the decision in Lamb which plaintiff relies 
upon to apply the common carrier standard in the present case is, 
at best, dicta. In distinguishing between the risks associated 
with different types of transportation, the Utah court in dicta 
stated: 
The heightened standard of care required of 
common carriers is predicated on the 
principle that fl[p]ersons using ordinary 
transportation devices, such as elevators 
and buses, normally expect to be carried 
safely, securely, and without incident to 
their destination." 
Id. at 930. 
This language does not constitute an adoption of the common 
carrier standard to the owners or operators of elevators. As the 
Utah court in Lamb pointed out, the common carrier standard 
normally only applies where a fee is charged by the carrier. 
Where the Utah Supreme Court has refused to apply a common 
carrier duty to amusement ride operators, this Court should not 
apply it to landlords. 
Not only have the courts of Utah not adopted the common 
carrier standard as to commercial building owners or managers, 
but the Utah Court of Appeals has reaffirmed, as recently as 
1994, the "reasonable care" standard in such cases. See 
Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
B. The Lav of the Case Precludes Application of a Common 
Carrier standard. 
As noted above, the law of the case doctrine applies to 
prior appellate court rulings on issues of law, not factual 
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determinations. An issue of law that was determined by this 
Court in the prior appeal was the standard of care that applies 
to Boyer Company, As this Court held: 
[T]he plaintiff has the burden of showing 
the owner knew, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should have known, a dangerous 
condition existed and the owner had 
sufficient time to take corrective action. 
Kleinert, 854 P.2d at 1028 (emphasis added). 
For the reasons incorrectly applied by plaintiff to this 
Court's factual determination, the law of the case doctrine did 
indeed bind the trial court to apply the reasonable care standard 
in this case following remand. State v. Thomas, 777 P. 2d 445 
(Utah 1989); Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988); Tracy 
v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 1980). 
C. No Evidence was Presented to Establish Liability Under a 
Common Carrier Standard, 
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant was subject to a common 
carrier standard of care as to the elevators, the record is void 
of evidence to support a finding of liability under such a 
standard. 
As already established, no evidence was offered showing the 
existence of a dangerous condition or that the elevators were 
"unreasonably dangerous" or that Boyer Company had any such 
knowledge prior to plaintiff's alleged accident. Plaintiff also 
failed to produce any evidence as to what the standard of care 
was among owners or managers of commercial buildings such as 185 
South State. Using the definition of the standard as unsuccess-
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fully argued by plaintiff in Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 
supra, it is still clear that plaintiff's evidence in this case 
was lacking. That definition stated: "As a common carrier 
defendant was required by law to use the highest degree of care 
for the safe carriage of plaintiff, to provide everything reason-
ably necessary for that purpose and to exercise a reasonable 
degree of skill." 
Even this higher standard does not make a common carrier an 
insurer of the passenger's safety. Rather, the carrier is 
required to do what is "reasonably necessary" and to "exercise a 
reasonable degree of skill". In the present case there was no 
evidence which established a breach of this standard. There was 
no evidence that a different make or model of elevator was safer, 
no evidence that other elevator safety features or equipment 
was available or would have prevented plaintiff's accident6, no 
evidence that other building managers or owners took any 
different or additional safety precautions regarding elevators 
and no evidence that what Boyer Company did or didn't do varied 
from the "highest degree" of care. 
In contrast to the lack of evidence showing that Boyer 
Company could have done more to assure elevator safety, the 
6
 The only elevator technician called was Mr. Ed Williams. He 
was an employee of Kimball and had worked on the elevators at 185 
South State and other locations having the same models. (Record pp. 
1371-1371A). As the only mechanical expert, he testified that the 
accident as described by the plaintiff in this case was impossible. 
(Record p. 1373) 
31 
representatives of Kimball Elevator testified that the elevators 
were safe and Boyer Company acted responsibly: 
1. There was no period of time that the elevators were in 
operation that they were not covered under a service agreement or 
warranty. (Testimony of Brent Russon, Record pp. 1278-1280). 
2. There was no compromise to the elevators' safety in the 
service contract entered into between Boyer Company and Kimball. 
(Testimony of Brent Russon, Record pp. 1280, 1288, 1293). 
3. The Boyer Company had procedures in place to report 
after-hour service calls on the elevators to Kimball. (Testimony 
of Brent Russon, Record p. 1283) . 
4. The Boyer Company never requested Kimball not to 
respond to service calls. (Testimony of Brent Russon, Record p. 
1286) . 
5. The elevators in question were free of complaints or 
reports that they were injuring or harming anyone. (Testimony of 
Brent Russon, Record p. 1289). 
6. The contract between Kimball and Boyer provided for the 
same inspections and service as any other elevator service 
contract. Safety was not compromised. (Testimony of Brent 
Russon, Record p. 1293). 
7. The occasional leveling off or so-called "yo-yoing" of 
the elevators never produced any injuries or complaints. 
(Testimony of Ed Williams, Record pp. 1372-1374). 
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Given the lack of evidence regarding what other safety 
precautions, if any, Boyer Company could have taken, the jury 
would have been required to indulge in pure speculation in 
applying such a standard in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case establishes that no evidence was 
produced by plaintiff tending to show (a) the existence of a 
dangerous condition in the elevators, (b) that Boyer Company knew 
or reasonably should have known of such a dangerous condition, or 
(c) knowledge at a time before plaintiff's alleged accident in 
order to take corrective measures. 
Plaintiff's failure to produce such evidence is not justi-
fied by this Court's prior ruling on the summary judgment issue. 
The trial court properly followed this Court's order to conduct 
"further proceedings" and the directed verdict was proper both in 
light of the absence of evidence to establish a prima facie case 
and this Court's ruling that the applicable standard of care was 
one of "reasonable care". 
Plaintiff's argument to adopt a common carrier duty by 
landlords as to tenants must be rejected because this Court has 
already determined that the "reasonable care" standard applies in 
this case. The record also shows a lack of evidence in support 
of liability under a common carrier standard of care. 
Plaintiff has had repeated and ample opportunities to 
present evidence sufficient to establish a claim. She had three 
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days before a jury and did not produce evidence of a prima facie 
case. The trial court properly directed a verdict. This Court 
should affirm the order of the court below as the only decision 
warranted by the record in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this &% day of March, 1995. 
STRONG & HANNI 
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